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AGENCY RESPONSES TO NEPA: 
A COMPARISON AND IMPLICATIONS* 
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS** 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) has been 
acclaimed as a Congressional mandate requiring all federal agencies, 
whatever their traditional missions and responsibilities, to give in­
creased consideration to the impacts of their actions upon the human 
environment. 1 Five years have passed since NEPA was enacted, and 
though much has been written about it, few studies have investigated 
the response to the law by the various federal agencies. This paper 
reports some findings of a study comparing two agencies engaged in 
similar activities. 2 
It is important to bear in mind the full content of NEPA to 
evaluate its implementation, particularly since the detailed state­
ments (environmental impact statements, or EIS's) it requires are 
frequently discussed without reference to the purposes of the Act. 
NEPA included three major elements: the declaration of a national 
eavironmental policy; the establishment of a set of procedural re­
quirements, including but not limited to the EIS; and the creation of 
a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to advise the President 
a,.1d oversee implementation of the Act. These elements were mu­
tually supportive and interdependent. The procedures were not 
intended to be treated as ends in themselves, but as action-forcing 
provisions to compel implementation of the law's policy purposes.3 
Two fundamental criteria should be employed to evaluate agency 
responses to the Act: the extent to which an agency has incorporated 
*The research reported here was supported in part by a Resources Fellowship granted by 
Resources for the Future, Inc. All opinions and conclusions, however, are the author's. 
** Associate Professor of Natural Resource Policy, Univ. of Michigan. 
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1970).
2. For a full report of this research see R. Andrews, Environmental Policy and Admin­
istrative Change (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1972), to be published in 
revised and updated form in July 1976 by D. C. Heath & Co. One other comparative 
evaluation study is U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, An Evaluation of Implementa­
tion and Administration of NEPA by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management 
(Preliminary Report, February 1974). Fcir a general five-year overview of NEPA's imple­
mentation see U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1974 ch. 4. 
(1974). 
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Sen. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st.
Sess., at 9 (July 9, 1969). 
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the law's procedural requirements and the extent to which such 
incorporation has led to outcomes consistent with NEPA's policy 
goals. 
Policies and procedures established by NEPA required consider­
able interpretation to translate them into operational criteria for 
administrative action, and this interpretive task was largely left to the 
discretion of each agency and administrator. This discretion may 
have been unavoidable in view of the wide range of actions and 
administrative processes affected by the Act, but one consequence 
was to permit great variation in response among and within federal 
agencies. CEQ was made responsible for reviewing and appraising 
implementation of the law and was authorized by executive order to 
issue guidelines on the subject.4 In practice CEQ merely issued guide­
lines concerning the preparation of EIS's, leaving interpretation of the 
law's substantive policy, other procedural duties, and certain ques­
tions concerning the impact statements themselves to the operating 
agencies. 
It is instructive to compare the initial responses to this law of 
federal agencies engaged in similar activities. Such comparison pro­
vides insight into behavior patterns of agencies, and into the effec­
tiveness of new legislative mandates in bringing about changes in 
administrative behavior. This study compares two water resource 
development programs, the Civil Works Program of the Army Corps 
of Engineers and the Small Watersheds Program of the Soil Conserva­
tion Service (SCS). 
THE CORPS AND THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE 
The effectiveness of NEPA must ultimately be measured by its 
ability to cut through intervening organizational and political vari­
ables that shape the behavior of government agencies and influence 
the substantive activities in which those agencies engage. The Corps 
of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) differ in impor­
tant aspects of their organization and political environment, but 
engage in certain similar (and sometimes identical) activities. The 
differences in environment and the similarities in activities must be 
appreciated to understand each agency's ability to respond to NEPA. 
The Corps is fundamentally an engineering agency whose mission 
is the construction of public works projects. The construction of 
water resource development projects is one of its principal activities, 
4. NEPA, § 204(3) 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); Executive Order No. 11514, March 5,
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247. For a full evaluation of the Council see Liroff, The Council on 
Environmental Quality, 3 Environmental L. Rep. 50051 (1973). 
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though it also carries out extensive military and post office constru 
tion, military combat support, and other engineering functions. I 
water resource engineering mandate originated in nineteenth centuryj 
political pressures to use federal funds for internal improvements o 
navigable water courses to foster economic development. Its profe 
sional staff consists primarily of civil engineers, though in recent 
years it has increased its representation of other relevant pro,, 
fessions.5 The staff of 30,000 consists overwhelmingly of civilians 
who work under a military chain of command directed by approx.:
imately 250 engineer officers. 
The Corps has broad options for shaping its program within the 
general mission of civil works construction. It has a large budget 
($1.3 billion in 1971 ), 60 per cent of which is devoted to actual. 
construction,6 and there are no limits on the size or costs of its
projects as long as the benefits, exceed the costs and Congress is
willing to fund them. The benefits may be calculated against a broad 
range of authorized project purposes, including navigation, flood 
control, hydroelectric power production, recreation, fish and wildlife, 
enhancement and municipal water supply.7 Corps projects may re­
quire local cooperation, but the agency has much discretion in the• 
planning, design, implementation and operation of its projects. 
Finally, the Corps has great flexibility in the development and 
execution of its activities as a result of its administrative and political 
circumstances. It has almost complete administrative autonomy· 
within the Department of Defense to carry out civil works functions, 
since these activities are only remotely related to the central mission 
of that Department. This autonomy is assured by strong support for 
those functions in Congress and the fact that supervision is vested in·· 
Congressional committees which oversee public works rather than 
military expenditures. The Corps has broad geographic flexibility, 
permitting it to construct projects in any state or Congressional dis- · 
trict. Its constituency includes both urban and rural po)Julations, 
accounting for its broad political appeal in Congress. The Corps · 
usually has a backlog of several hundred projects that have been 
authorized but not yet funded. By obtaining Congressional approval, 
it can easily adjust its priorities among these projects in response to 
changing political demands.8 
5. Staff of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. Civil Works
Program of the Corps of Engineers: A Report to the Secretary of the Army by the Civil 
Works Study Board, at 21-23, 55-61 (Comm. Print 1966). 
6. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Government
Fiscal Year 1972, at 288-91 (1971). 
7. Civil Works Program, supra note 5, at 24-38, 29-54, 62-63.
8. Id. at 62-63, 39-54.
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The Soil Conservation Service, in contrast, is not primarily an 
engineering agency, and it differs significantly from the Corps in 
important characteristics of its organization and political environ­
ment. Its central historical mission is agricultural soil and water con­
servation. SCS became involved in water management because of the 
role water plays in soil conservation and because of the need for 
conservation assistance for farmers during the Depression dust 
bowls.9 Conservation of these resources is still perceived as the 
primary mission of the agency . 1 0 Other activities of SCS include soil 
and snow surveys, land inventory and monitoring, plant testing for 
conservation purposes, and technical and financial assistance in 
conservation practices for cropland, pastures, woodland, wildlife, and 
other soil-related resources. Represented on its professional staff are 
a mixture of resource-related disciplines, including civil engineers. 
SCS has a narrower range of options available to it than does the 
Corps in planning and designing water resource projects. Its water­
shed program budget is one-tenth the size of the Corps', and its 
projects are limited by law in size and costs, requiring the agency to 
defer to the Corps if action of greater magnitude becomes neces­
sary . 1 1 The range of purposes authorized for SCS projects is nar­
rower than for the Corps. SCS has no responsibility or authority in 
the areas of navigation and hydroelectric power production, and 
there are differences in the levels of permissible cost-sharing. SCS' 
staff is one of the largest in the Department of Agriculture (15,000), 
but only half the size of the Corps, and only a fraction of that staff is 
engaged in water resource activities. Finally, the SCS water resource 
program operates by means of technical and financial assistance to 
local sponsoring organizations, and is constrained by the necessity of 
arriving at a legal agreement mutually acceptable to the agency and 
the local organization. 1 2 It therefore has less discretion than the 
Corps in its choice of clients and in the development of projects. 
Furthermore, its authority to implement and operate projects that it 
finances is limited to ensuring that provisions of the work plan agree­
ment are adhered to. 
SCS does not have great autonomy within the Department of 
9. See, e.g., A. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal ch. 20 (1958).
10. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 
1974 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 146-271 (1973); 
see also U.S. Department of Agriculture, Assistance Available from the Soil Conservation 
Service, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 345 (1970). 
11. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental . . .  Appropriations, supra note 10, at
148-149; see also Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, Public Law 83-566, 16
U.S.C. § § 1001-1008 as amended (Small Watershed Act).
12. Id
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Agriculture, since its water resource activities are viewed as one of 
the Department's major sources of technical and financial aid for 
farmers. Larger projects are subject to oversight by Congressional 
public works committees, but all other activities fall under agricul­
tural committees including agriculture appropriations subcom­
mittees. SCS' access to diverse clienteles is limited by the agricultural 
orientation of its principal activities and overseers, and by its low 
visibility in urbanized areas from which many Congressmen are 
elected. 
While these two agencies differ in some organizational and polit­
ical respects, their water resource development activities have impor­
tant similarities. Both agencies impound streams behind dams and 
line stream channels with concrete and it is reasonable to compare 
the effects of NEPA's environmental policy mandate on the execu­
tion of such environmental modifications. The purposes for which 
these activities are carried out are also similar. While the Corps' 
mission is broader, both build dam and channel projects with the 
intent of providing flood damage reduction, municipal water supply, 
recreation opportunities, and fish and wildlife habitat enhancement. 
Finally, the criteria by which the two agencies' projects are justi­
fied are identical and predicated upon economic benefits rather than 
physical conservation objectives. 1 3 The fundamental mission of SCS 
may be conservation of soil and water, but it justifies water resource 
projects on the basis of economic benefits, as does the Corps, and its 
budget for water resource projects represents nearly 40 per cent of 
its annual appropriations. 1 4 It should not be assumed that SCS 
projects are more consistent with environmental policy purposes 
than projects proposed by the Corps because economic assistance to 
farmers is no more inherently environmentally sound than economic 
assistance to commerce and industry. 
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO NEPA 
The Corps and SCS both recognized that NEPA applied to their 
water resource programs and took steps to implement the Act. They 
differed in the extent and timing of those steps, in their treatment of 
13. From 1962 until 197 3 both agencies were required to justify their proposed projects
using criteria established in Sen. Comm. on Public Works, Policies, Standards and Procedures 
in the Formulation, Evaluation and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and 
Related Land Resources, Sen. Doc. No. 87-97, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962). In 1973 these 
were superseded by U.S. Water Resource Council, Principles and Standards for Planning 
Water and Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24778 (1973). The latter document 
loosened in principle the emphasis of the former upon economic measures, but it has not 
yet been fully implem�nted. 
14. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental ... Appropriations, supra note 10, at 148.
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projects underway, and in their openness to the public involvement 
mandate of NEPA. Despite these differences, both agencies' re­
sponses were directed primarily to NEPA's procedures rather than its 
substantive policy goals, and both were motivated by external 
political pressures rather than commitment by agency administrators 
to NEPA's objectives. 
Implementation of NEPA 's Policy 
The Corps interpreted NEPA as a mandate to be reflected on its 
plans and decisions, while SCS, at least until 197 4, interpreted it as a 
reiteration of its existing objectives. 
The Corps took the position that NEPA created a new criterion 
for federal action, authorizing it to consider a broader range of 
effects than had been considered previously. It directed recognition 
of environmental quality as a new objective for planning,1 5 and 
requested funds and personnel to carry out its new responsibilities. 1 6 
According to the testimony of the Corps' Director of Civil Works: 
It wasn't until the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act 
that we really had in our hands the authority to spend money, time 
and effort in this field over and above what were the precedent­
setting studies in which economic development and the benefit-cost 
ratio were the be-all-and-end-all. 1 7 
SCS, in contrast, interpreted NEPA as a reinforcement of its pre­
vious missions and policies. For at least two years after NEPA's 
enactment it directed no change in the range of considerations enter­
ing into its water resource planning process and requested no new 
funds or personnel to carry out the mandate of NEPA. Proponents 
and critics of water resource projects agree that traditional criteria 
narrowly focused on economic development, yet only the Corps 
interpreted NEPA as broadening those criteria and recognized the 
law's mandate for increased attention to noneconomic measures of 
environmental quality. Until 1974 SCS's policy was that NEPA 
"reinforces the mission of the Soil Conservation Service. "1 8 
15. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Circular (hereinafter EC) 1165-2-83, March
3, 1970; EC 1165-2-86, April, 30, 1970; and EC 1165-2-500, November 30, 1970, Environ­
mental Guidelines for the Civil Works Program of the Corps of Engineers. 
16. See Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Atomic Energy
Commission Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1972 Before the Sen. Comm. on Public Works, 
92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1971). 
17. Testimony of Major General Frank P. Koisch, Hearings on Stream Channelization
Before the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 556, 580 
(1971). 
18. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, at 2-3, Mar. 19, 1971; see 
also U.S. Congress, Hearings on Red Tape Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92nd 
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In a general sense NEPA reinforces the mission of conserving soil 
and water and demands precisely the sort of harmonious relationship 
between human activities and their biological and physical resource 
base that SCS was established to achieve. But in taking this policy 
position, SCS ignored the crucial differences between the physical 
conservation mission of the agency as a whole and the fundamental 
economic mission of its Small Watershed Program. It failed to take 
the position of policy leadership in implementing NEPA that might 
have been expected of it. 
Moreover, SCS failed to recognize conflict between policy and 
procedures established by NEPA and the isolated pursuit of any
single mission-even soil conservation. SCS has a tradition of exper­
tise in agricultural soil erosion and runoff, but admits to little 
experience in such closely related topics as water quality, erosion and 
sediment transport characteristics of streams, downstream and 
ground water effects of stream channelization, and the effects of its 
actions on water quality, fish, wildlife habitat, and wetland produc­
tivity . 1 9 NEPA provided an opportunity for SCS significantly to 
broaden the range of its concerns, but the agency chose instead to 
interpret the Act as a reinforcement of its normal activities. 
In 1974 SCS guidelines for implementation of NEPA finally 
reinterpreted the agency's own mission to give equal weight to three 
related goals: 
I) Quality in the natural resource base for sustained use;
2) Quality in environment to provide attractive, convenient, and
satisfying places to live, work and play; and
3) Quality in the standard of living based on community improve­
ment and adequate income.20 
With these guidelines SCS recognized the necessity of redefining 
its mission more broadly to fulfill the purposes of NEPA. At approx­
imately the same time, SCS inaugurated intensive and reportedly 
outstanding ecological training programs for staff members, pro­
jected to include more than 400 individuals from key positions 
throughout the organization.2 1 
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-15, at 217 (1971); Environment Memorandum 1 (Revised), Decem­
ber 11, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 23674. 
19. For testimony see SCS, Questions and Answers with respect to Watershed Program 
Activities prepared by SCS Watershed Group, August 1971. Reprinted in Hearings on 
Agriculture-Environmental . .. Appropriations, supra note 10, at 344-380. 
20. 39 Fed. Reg. 19646 et seq., June 3, 1974.
21. Staff members of the Council on Environmental Quality praised these training pro­
grams in conversations with the author. 
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Implementation of NEPA 's Procedures 
The Corps responded immediately and affirmatively to NEPA's 
procedural requirements, particularly that of environmental impact 
statements, and made early and sustained policy commitments to 
their implementations. SCS, in contrast, sought to avoid these re­
quirements for two or three years, and not until 1973 and 197 4 did 
its procedures approach the level of implementation previously 
attained by the Corps. 
The Corps provided detailed instructions for procedural imple­
mentation to its field offices in April and September 1970 and May 
1971, and reinforced these with a series of supplementary directives. 
The instructions contained discussions of problems noted by the 
Washington office concerning EIS's submitted from the field, increas­
ingly detailed specification of the procedures to be followed in 
implementing NEPA, the environmental impacts to be considered, 
and repeated emphasis on new policies adopted by the Corps in its 
official response to NEPA.2 2 Other instructions followed, and thor­
ough revisions were issued in February 1973 and again in April 
1974.2 3 By 1974 the Corps' guidelines were still exemplary among 
federal agencies, they required integrated assessment of social, eco­
nomic, and environmental impacts, coordination with other agencies 
and citizens throughout the planning of projects, development of 
alternatives weighted toward environmental protection and enhance­
ment, and environmental analyses as detailed as engineering, eco­
nomic, and other studies. 
SCS displayed far less progress in its implementation of NEPA's 
procedures during this period. One general policy memorandum was 
issued in May 1970; specific instructions were not issued until March 
and April 1971. These later instructions merely restated the language 
of the Act without elaboration.2 4 No suggestions to improve ad­
mittedly deficient EIS's were issued nor were changes in environ­
mental standards ordered.2 5 
Not until mid-1972 were important new changes issued. At that 
time SCS personnel were directed to perform an environmental 
inventory during the first pre-planning environmental reconnaissance 
22. EC 1165-2-83 (March 3, 1970); EC 1165-2-86 (April 30, 1970); ENGCW-C M/1 (June
2, 1970); EC 1120-2-56 (September 25, 1970); EC 1165-2-500 (November 30, 1970); and 
ER 1105-2-507 (May 28, 1971); 36 Fed. Reg. 11309 (June 11, 1971). 
23. 38 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb1uary 16, 1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 12737 (April 8, 1974).
24. Soil Conservation Service, Watersheds Memorandum 103 (May 1, 1970); Environ­
ment Memorandum 1 (March 19, 1971); Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-17 
(April 7, 1971). 
25. See Hearings on Administration of NEPA Before House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 91st. Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 985 (1970). 
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study, to present all feasible alternatives (including objectives which 
differed from those of local project sponsors) in the impact state­
ment, to conduct a public information meeting on the preliminary 
investigation report, and to append to the final EIS copies of all 
substantive letters of comment submitted on the draft statement. 
They were also instructed to prepare EIS's for all stream channel 
excavation projects that might have significant environmental 
impacts.2 6 Instructions similar to these, and in most cases more
detailed, had been given to Corps personnel a year earlier in May 
1971. Corps procedures were available to SCS, and there is evidence 
of direct pressure on SCS during and after 1971 from CEQ to im­
prove policies and procedures.2 7 Evidently SCS deliberately chose 
not to move as far or as fast as the Corps during this period. 
Between 1972 and 197 4, SCS' procedural guidelines underwent 
sweeping revision, and by 197 4 they were comparable to those of the 
Corps. Among the changes made were requirements that collection 
of data for the EIS begin simultaneously with preparation of the 
project application; that cumulative and regional impacts be con­
sidered along with impacts on historical, social, and economic values; 
and that SCS field offices take an active role to ensure broad public 
access to planning and decision processes.2 8 In June 1973 SCS issued 
a lengthy advisory memorandum, which commented in detail on 
deficiencies in earlier impact statements and recommended specific 
corrective measures. Then in 197 4 the agency issued for trial use an 
"Environmental Assessment Procedure" to assist its field staff in 
preparing the substance of EIS's.2 9 
The changes in SCS guidelines between 1972 and 197 4 repre­
sented a major shift in posture toward implementation of NEPA's 
procedures. SCS documents prior to 1972 reflected a desire to avoid 
NEPA's procedures rather than to interpret and apply them. SCS 
instructions from 1972 on, in contrast, demonstrated a symbolic 
commitment to embrace and implement these procedures. Signif­
icantly, CEQ testified in 1974 that the impact statements produced 
by the Corps of Engineers were the best among federal agencies, and 
those of SCS were among the most improved. 3 0 
26. Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-19, May 24, 1972.
27. Letter dated December 15, 1970, from Mr. Timothy Atkeson (CEQ) to Dr. T. C.
Byerly (U.S.D.A.). Quoted in Hearings on Stream Channelization, supra note 17, at 392. 
28. See Environment Memoranda 9, 10, 12, and 13 (all 1972); and 39 Fed. Reg. 19646
et seq. (June 3, 1974). 
29. Soil Conservation Service, Advisory WS-26 (June 25, 1973); Soil Conservation 
Service, Environmental Assessment Procedure, May 1974. 
30. Hearings on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for
1973 Before House Comm. on Appropriations, Pt. 5, at 944 (1974). 
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Application of NEPA to Previously Authorized Projects 
The agencies differed in their treatment of projects authorized or 
planned prior to the law's enactment. NEPA contained no grand­
father clause exempting such projects from its requirements, and 
required an EIS whenever any major federal action remained to be 
taken. The Corps and SCS applied this test in quite different ways. 
The Corps directed that EIS's be prepared by its field offices for 
all projects on which any major federal action remained to be taken 
and that any doubt be resolved in favor of preparing the statement. 
While not directing that these statements include substantive review 
of the projects' merits in light of NEPA's policy goals, the Corps did 
require that EIS's be prepared and made public in fulfillment of the 
letter of the Act. As a result, by the end of 1971 the Corps had 
submitted 435 statements to CEQ, far more than any other agency 
except the Department of Transportation. 3 1 
SCS, in contrast, directed that EIS's be prepared for partially 
planned projects on a case-by-case basis, leaving great discretion to 
field officials to weigh the costs and benefits of doing so. In practice 
this meant that while the Corps and SCS each had between 1,000 
and 1,200 backlogged projects at the time of NEP A's enactment, 
SCS had prepared only 87 detailed statements on water projects by 
the end of 1971 in contrast to the Corps' 435. 3 2 
While it prepared far fewer impact statements, SCS did order a 
substantive review of all projects that involved stream channelization. 
These amounted to two-thirds of its authorized projects at the time 
of the directive in February 1971, which stated that NEPA was the 
primary basis for this review. 3 3 Stream channelization projects were 
virtually the only category of SCS actions that aroused concern 
about environmental impacts, so this directive amounted to a review 
of all SCS activities that were environmentally controversial at the 
time. Unfortunately, no new criteria were established to reflect 
NEPA's purposes. Channelization was still to be used to permit the 
profitable use of flood plains, though serious consideration should be 
given to nonstructural alternatives. No explicit relationship was 
established between this review and the detailed statement require­
ment. The purpose of the review was to group channelization 
projects into three categories: those with none, some, and serious 
environmental impacts. The categorization was to be accomplished 
31. EC 1165-2-83 (March 3, 1970); U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, I 102
Monitor No. 12, at 66. 
32. Soil Conservation Service, Environment Memorandum 1 at 4-5 (March 19, 1971);
Council on Environmental Quality I 102 Monitor No. 12, at 66. 
33. Soil Conservation Service, Watersheds Memorandum 108 (February 4, 1971).
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with the participation of fish and wildlife agencies, but in practice 
there were significant differences of opinion between the agencies 
concerning appropriate classification of many projects. In some cases 
these classifications permitted evasion of the procedures established 
by NEPA.34 
The Corps sought to ensure that its actions subsequent to the 
enactment of NEPA were procedurally in compliance with the Act, 
while SCS sought to avoid involving itself with NEPA's procedures 
but substantively reviewed the one category of actions considered 
environmentally controversial. The difference is important, since 
NEPA's procedures were intended to be the action-forcing mechan­
ism which would ensure implementation of its policy goals. The 
Corps' approach imposed a heavy paperwork burden on its staff and 
generated a substantial number of superficial documents, but did 
force a learning process throughout the organization by necessitating 
that NEPA-related questions be considered in conjunction with pro­
gram decisions. The SCS' approach was less burdensome, but it 
evaded the educational process of writing EIS's and focused on 
environmental controversiality rather than environmental impacts as 
the implicit criterion for reassessment of its activities. In view of 
their histories and missions, SCS may not have needed the environ­
mental education process as badly as the Corps. In any case, SCS did 
not initially use the detailed statement requirement to stimulate such 
a process. 
Public Involvement 
The Corps' policy statements and guidelines linked preparation of 
impact statements to procedures for early and repeated public in­
volvement in project planning, including active solicitation of com­
ments at early stages in its administrative processes. SCS, in fOntrast, 
encouraged a flow of information about proposed projects from local 
sponsoring organizations to the public, but until 1974 did not itself 
take an active role in soliciting public comments, nor did it en­
courage or permit early public review of EIS's. 
The Corps delegated responsibility for the preparation, public 
disclosure, and defense of EIS's to its District Engineers and required 
that these actions precede submission of recommendations to 
34. NEPA's EIS requirement could be evaded by striking bargains with fish and wildlife
agencies concerning project design and mitigation measures, following which the projects 
could be redefined as having no significant environmental impacts and thus not requiring 
preparation of an impact statement. The danger in this practice was that other agencies and 
the public were not necessarily parties to these discussions, and thus non-fish and wildlife 
impacts that might be identified from an EIS might never surface. 
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Washington. It also emphasized the necessity of integrating environ­
mental assessment into all phases of planning. 3 5 Corps guidelines 
stressed early and continuous liaison with interested sectors of the 
public to raise and resolve potential objections as early as possible, 
and ordered that multiple public meetings and other vehicles for such 
liaison be utilized during the course of planning. The agency's policy 
is captured succinctly in the testimony of its Director of Civil Works 
in December 1970: "We want [potential controversies] out just as 
soon as we can get them out."3 6 
SCS required local sponsors to disseminate information to the 
public throughout the project planning, and beginning in mid-1972 
required that a first public meeting be held at the completion of the 
preliminary investigation report. This meeting was to include discus­
sion of tentative agreements reached by the sponsors and SCS con­
cerning potential alternatives. However, SCS guidelines treated the 
public information provision as primarily a one-way process to be 
initiated after tentative agreements had been reached, rather than as 
an active solicitation of public preferences and objections. Moreover, 
the guidelines defined this information process as the responsibility 
of the sponsoring organization, not SCS. Finally, the impact state­
ment was to be made public only at the final stage of project review 
formalities, after tentative agreement had been reached on a final 
work plan and after Washington had reviewed the plan and the 
EIS.3 7 Not until issuance of the 1973 and 1974 guideline revisions 
did SCS direct that draft impact statements be prepared and made 
public in the field, and that SCS officials actively seek out and in­
volve four different categories of publics in their planning and deci­
sion processes. 3 8 
Procedural Versus Substantive Changes 
The actions that both agencies took in response to NEPA focused 
on the Act's procedural requirements rather than its policy goals, 
particularly on procedures for preparation of EIS's. However, signif­
icant differences were evident between the two agencies' water re­
source programs and priorities during the period; these differences 
35. EC 1165-2-86 (April 30, 1970).
36. Hearings on Administration of NEPA, supra note 25, at 926 (testimony of Major
General Frank P. Koisch). See also the remarks of Lt. General F. J. Clarke, Chief of 
Engineers, quoted in EC 1165-2-100 (May 28, 1971), Public Participation in Water Resource 
Planning. 
37. Watershed Protection Handbook Notice 1-17, April 7, 1971, § § 113.132(b),
113.133, 113.1331, 113.1332. 
38. 39 Fed. Reg. 19646 et seq. June 3, 1974.
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must be noted though they may have been only indirectly influenced 
by NEPA. 
The guidlines of both the Corps and SCS were confined primarily 
to implementation of the detailed statement requirement of NEPA.
Neither agency provided formal guidance for compliance with 
Section 102(2)(B), which required the development of procedures 
and methods for giving appropriate consideration to unquantifiable 
values. Nor was there guidance concerning the applicability of the 
law's policy goals such as preservation of diversity, achieving balance 
between population and resource use, enhancing the quality of 
renewable resources, and maximizing recycling of depletable 
resources. The water resource activities of the Corps' and SCS have 
important implications for the achievement of such goals, yet efforts 
of both agencies, as well as of CEQ, reflected a strong preoccupation 
with the detailed statement procedure rather than with the law as a 
whole. 
Available evidence suggests that few substantive changes in pro­
posed water projects were made by either agency as a direct conse­
quence of NEPA. In the case of the Corps, survey responses in late 
1971 indicated that less than one-fifth of the projects for which 
impact statements had been prepared (six per cent of authorized 
projects) had been affected in any substantive way as a result of 
NEPA. In more than 60 per cent of these cases the effect was listed 
as postponement rather than cancellation or significant change. 3 9 
Similar survey responses from SCS indicated substantive effects on 
approximately six per cent of its authorized watershed planning 
processes. In two-thirds of these cases the effect was identified 
simply as a postponement. It is possible that these percentages would 
increase as agency efforts gradually turned to projects less fully 
planned at the inception of NEPA, yet such changes would have to 
be attributed increasingly to intervening variables rather than the 
specific influence of the Act. Changes in the agencies that were 
specifically attributable to NEPA were primarily procedural. 
Despite similar preoccupation with NEPA's procedures and the 
similar paucity of substantive changes in their projects, important 
differences were evident in the two agencies' overal programmatic 
priorities during this period. 
While the Corps did not renounce its traditional engineering 
39. Survey questionnaires were mailed to all District Engineers of the Corps and all State
Conservationists of the SCS in October 1971, asking a series of questions concerning effort 
and cost devoted to preparation of impact statements, effects of NEPA on planned actions, 
and other dimensions of response to NEPA. Responses were received from 7 5 to 90 per cent 
of the individuals surveyed, depending on the question. 
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activities, it did initiate significant program changes between 1972 
and 1974. One was a pilot program of environmental reconnaissance 
inventories intended to develop and synthesize information on sig­
nificant environmental and resource values on a statewide or district­
wide basis. Another was a proposal to use strictly nonstructural 
measures (specifically, the purchase of flood plain lands) in three 
projects, a proposal which was subsequently approved by Congress in 
1973.40 A third was a new program of urban studies which grew 
from five pilot wastewater management studies to studies in more 
than 26 urban areas within one year. More than one-third of the 
agency's total study funds for fiscal year 1974 were devoted to this 
program. 
Though these programs were experimental rather than central to 
the Corps' activities, the depth and rapidity of its plunge into urban 
water quality studies suggested the possibility that a major new 
mission for the Corps was in the making. Realizing that an increasing­
ly urban population might oppose its traditional flood control 
projects, the agency was astute enough to seek authority for popular 
activities and to tum some of its engineering skills from rural dam 
construction or urban wastewater management. 
SCS, in contrast, showed virtually no signs of change in the pri­
orities of its water resource program during this period, and in fact 
the agency congratulated itself during its budget hearings each year 
because it was setting new records for water project construction 
during an era of environmental concerns.4 1 SCS testimony indicates 
deliberate avoidance of environmentally controversial projects in 
setting agency priorities, but no change in traditional purposes, 
clients, or types of water resource activities comparable to those of 
the Corps. 4 2 
40. Water Resource Development Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § l 962d-5c (Supp. IV, 1974).
41. Hearings on Agriculture ... Appropriations for 1974, supra note 10, at 192, 278,
328,419; Hearings on Agriculture . .. Appropriations for 1973, Pt. 2, at 360, 416, 430. 
42. Hearings on Agriculture . .. Appropriations for 1974, supra note 10, at Hearings,
Part 2, pp. 392-393. It is important to note that the reasons for this posture did not 
necessarily lie within the agency. Significantly, SCS was given authority by two laws enacted 
in 1972 and 1973 to broaden its program (and potentially to shift its priorities), including 
such activities as flood plain purchase, land use inventory and monitoring, water quality 
management, and other environmental enhancement activities. See, the Water Resource 
Development Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-5c (Supp. IV 1974); and the Rural Develop­
ment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 3122 (Supp. IV 1974). By the end of 1974, however, it still 
had not been delegated the authority or provided with funds to implement these activities. 
Several political considerations may help to explain this circumstance, but a central one 
appears to be the continuing commitment of the chairman of the House Agricultural 
Appropriation Subcommittee, who was also an author of the Small Watersheds Act, to 
keeping SCS' water resources program as primarily a program of technical and financial 
assistance to farmers. 
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Changes in the Corps' program were due only in part to the influ­
ence of NEPA, and the lack of change in SCS' water program 
demonstrates that NEPA did not effectively compel such changes. It 
is likely, however, that changes were made more feasible by the 
existence of NEPA and the forces it set in motion. The extent to 
which such influence occurred is probably of far greater consequence 
than the limited changes in specific projects and procedures. 
The crucial difference between the Corps and SCS on this count is 
that the Corps was able to view NEPA entrepreneurially as an 
opportunity for change rather than as a threat, while SCS was not 
able to do so. 
Causes of Change 
Available evidence suggests that political pressures from sources 
external to each agency were principal forces driving the implementa­
tion of NEPA, but that the sources and mixture of such pressures 
differed. In the case of the Corps these pressures were strong, reason­
ably unified and emanated principally from the vanguard of the 
environmental movement and the courts. Political pressures on SCS 
from the environmental movement were weaker. Only a handful of 
lawsuits were initiated against the SCS, and these were neutralized by 
counterpressure from the agency's traditional supporters in Congress. 
The only concerted pressures on SCS came from the fish and wildlife 
agencies and their constituencies, traditional foes of SCS' stream 
channelization programs, who seized on NEPA's interagency review 
requirements as a tactical instrument of opposition to those activ­
ities. 
The Corps was subjected to immediate and continuing pressures to 
implement NEPA. From the nature of its activities and its symbolic 
position as the federal government's principal engineering agency, it 
could not doubt that it would be a principal target of environmental 
interest groups. It was sued for noncompliance with NEPA six times 
within eight months after the law's enactment and lost at least eight 
such lawsuits by the end of 1971. 4 3 It was sued repeatedly there­
after, and while certain general boundaries in court rulings were 
evident by 1973, the threat and reality of extensive litigation effec­
tively placed pressure on the Corps to comply at least procedurally 
with NEPA. 
Survey responses from Corps officials attributed nearly three­
quarters of all NEPA-related decisions to cancel, postpone, or change 
projects to pressures from outside the federal government. These 
43. See F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts (1973}.
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included adverse state or local review, public controversy, or judicial 
decisions. Interestingly, few decisions significantly to change projects 
were attributed to judicial decisions, but an overwhelming propor­
tion of all projects affected by NEPA in any substantive way were 
located in districts that had been subjected to at least one NEPA-re­
lated lawsuit.4 4 A similar disproportion was evident in the estimates 
of effort devoted to the preparation of EIS's.4 5 These findings 
suggest that lawsuits may have had indirect beneficial consequences 
considerably greater than their modest effectiveness in challenging 
specific projects. 
The Soil Conservation Service, in contrast, was not subjected to 
overwhelming pressures to implement NEPA. The first NEPA lawsuit 
was not initiated against the SCS until late 1971.46 While by 1974 it 
had been defeated on several procedural issues in that particular case 
involving the Chicod Creek watershed in eastern North Carolina, it 
had been sued only half a dozen times and did not lose a second case 
until early 1975. Its only politically controversial practice was stream 
channelization, an activity which various fish and wildlife agencies 
and several Congressional committees were attempting to stop. But 
this was a long-standing battle in which NEPA simply provided a new 
tactical weapon rather than a new political force.4 7 Unlike the 
Corps, SCS could point to its conservation label and to the fact that 
most of its activities were not environmentally controversial. Insofar 
as Congressional pressures were concerned, its own oversight commit­
tees were both solidly in favor of the use of channelization and 
powerful enough to defeat any pressure that the Conservation and 
fish and wildlife committees were attempting to generate.4 8 
44. Twenty-seven per cent of the districts responding had been sued at least once, but
100 per cent of the projects cancelled, 58 per cent of those postponed, 35 per cent of those 
significantly changed, and 55 per cent of all projects in these three categories were located 
in these districts. 
45. Districts that had been sued reported a mean of 11 per cent more effort (median nine
per cent) for noncontroversial projects and 32 per cent more effort (median 42 per cent) for 
controversial projects than districts not sued. 
46. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. N. C. 1972).
The Chicod Creek project. 
4 7. See Hearings on Stream Channelization, supra note 17, a lengthy series of hearings 
held by the Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee 
on Government Operations, chaired by Rep. Henry Reuss. Parallel hearings were held in thy 
Senate. Even in the NEPA oversight hearings in December 1970 (Hear ing5 on Administra­
tion of NEPA, supra note 25), virtually all questioning of SCS centered on its authority to 
require fish and wildlife enhancement measures rather than on its implementation of NEPA 
per se. These hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva­
tion of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, chaired by Rep. John 
Dingell. This committee was the House sponsor of NEPA, but apparently was more con­
cerned with a particular traditional battle in its questioning of the SCS. 
48. Rep. Reuss' efforts to withhold funding of channelization projects were defeated;
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Survey responses from SCS officials indicated that external 
pressures played a lesser role in affecting projects than in the case of 
the Corps. Such pressures reportedly influenced only 40 per cent of 
project postponements by SCS, as opposed to nearly three-quarters 
of all NEPA-related project modifications by the Corps. Obviously, 
judicial decisions played no role at all during the period prior to the 
survey, since none had yet been issued. There is at least circum­
stantial evidence, however, that the Chicod Creek decision against 
the SCS in early 1972 may have helped bring about the subsequent 
series of reversals in SCS policy mentioned above. 
Interestingly, the dominant force influencing NEPA-related proj­
ect changes by SCS was comments by other federal agencies, com­
bined with SCS internal reevaluation or nonfederal pressures. Such 
comments were the most frequently reported cause of project post­
ponements and the second most frequently reported cause of signif­
icant changes in projects. This finding tends to confirm that pressures 
on SCS originated primarily with the federal fish and wildlife agency 
and its constituencies rather than with the vanguard of the new 
environmental movement that was pressuring the Corps.4 9 
Similarities in Response 
In highlighting differences between the agencies' responses it is 
important to keep in mind their substantial similarities in other 
respects. Few clear differences could be discerned, for instance, in 
the average quality of the EIS's submitted by the Corps and SCS 
during this period, although the Corps' best statements were dis­
tinctly more sophisticated than any prepared by SCS. There was 
little difference in the total number of project postponements or 
changes reported by field officials of each agency, though they · 
attributed these changes to different factors. Finally, though Corps 
policies appeared more enlightened than those of SCS, in practice it 
does not appear to have enforced these policies systematically, and 
many extremely superficial EIS's were merely approved and passed 
along rather than returned to the field for improvement. These 
similarities suggest caution in attempting sweeping conclusions from 
the contrasts, though they do not diminish the importance of the 
differences themselves. 
and the red tape hearings, supra note 18, were held by the Public Works Committee at the 
same time as the stream channelization hearings. They were used by the SCS Watersheds 
Administrator as a platform for complaints about Reuss' efforts. See, e.g., Hearings on Red 
Tape, supra note 18, at 217-18. 
49. Federal agency comments were cited by SCS state conservationists among the causes
of 48 per cent of the postponements and 27 per cent of the "significant changes." 
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EXPLANATION OF RESPONSES 
How might the differences between the two agencies' responses to 
NEPA best be explained? Three different explanations might be 
attempted; one interpreting agency behavior as that of rational actors 
pursuing different objectives, a second attributing behavior to 
differences in organizational characteristics, and a third emphasizing 
differences in the political pressures operating on them.5 0 No one is 
complete in itself, but taken together they offer what appears to be a 
reasonably detailed picture. 
Objectives 
Differences in program objectives do not explain variations in 
agency responses to NEPA since the two water programs showed 
similarity in their objectives and criteria for water resource develop­
ment actions. SCS' range of authorized purposes is narrower than 
that of the Corps, but there is no reason why it could not have used 
NEPA (as the Corps did) as a lever to broaden that field of purposes. 
Differences in agency objectives provide a better explanation, one 
particularly appealing to supporters of SCS. SCS is a conservation 
agency, the Corps an engineering one; it is not surprising that they 
should respond differently to NEPA. Yet the direction of response is 
the opposite of what one might expect, with the Corps appearing to 
lead the federal government in implementation of the law and SCS 
lagging several years behind. One would have expected SCS to take 
an early and strong role in interpreting and implementing NEPA 
because the Act's mandate was closely related (though not identical) 
to its. traditional mission. NEPA could have provided SCS with a 
broad lever for conservation of the physical environment to use 
against the shortsighted economic criteria of other agencies. Sim­
ilarly, one would expect the Corps to dig in its heels and resist a 
mandate so divergent from its traditional mission and practices. As 
this study demonstrates, however, the opposite occurred. 
Organizational Characteristics 
An analysis of the differences between the agencies as bureaucratic 
organizations leads to another promising explanation. Arguably the 
Corps was more responsive to NEPA because it is a larger and more 
autonomous agency, and its broad range of activities permits flex­
ibility to change priorities without threat to organizational survival. 
Moreover, it builds larger projects whose budgets can more easily 
accommodate the expense of additional environmental studies. 
50. These three approaches loosely follow Allison; see G. Allison, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). 
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These organizational characteristics help explain several observed 
differences between the agencies' responses to NEPA, but leave other 
important questions unanswered. Why did the agencies differ so 
sharply for four years in applying NEPA's policy to their water 
resource activities? Why did SCS identify environmental impacts 
primarily as affecting fish and wildlife, while the Corps adopted a 
more holistic approach to the environment? And why did the agen­
cies display such divergent attitudes towards public involvement? 
These differences are not explained by organizational characteristics 
alone, though such characteristics undoubtedly played an important 
contributory role in the overall pattern of agency behavior and re­
sponse. 
Political Pressures 
In confronting these questions, a plausible explanation emerges 
from a comparison of the sets of competing pressures in each 
agency's political environment. Differences in the mixtures of these 
political pressures did exist during the period studied, and were per­
ceived as being different by responsible field officials of the two 
agencies. 
The Corps was the subject of numerous attacks during this period 
by ad hoc coalitions and groups in the vanguard of the new environ­
mental movement, and the pressures brought were converted into 
credible threats by unprecedented numbers of injunctions granted 
against Corps projects by the federal judiciary. The Corps was also 
subjected to widespread notoriety in the press as a central political 
symbol of the callous modification of natural environments and was 
vulnerable (despite the vaunted political strength of its beneficiaries' 
lobby) to changes in the attitudes and preferences of the general 
public. It appears there was sympathy for the Corps' image problem 
in key quarters, including its Congressional oversight committees and 
the Office of Management and Budget. As a result it was permitted 
occasionally to take costly and unprecedented measures in response. 
These measures included making new studies, hiring personnel, 
involvement in urban programs, and flood plain acquisition. 
SCS appears to have been insulated from the pressures of 
opponents through this period by its lower profile with the environ­
mental movement and the aggressive protection of its Congressional 
overseers. SCS did not initially have the image problem that the 
Corps did because it was a smaller and more rural agency, less visible 
to the predominantly urban and suburban constituents of the envi­
ornmental movement. Also, its engineering activities were less 
obvious under the broad umbrella of soil conservation. Perhaps as a 
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result, it was not authorized to make costly or innovative changes in 
response to the law. 
SCS eventually developed an image problem as the press and 
Congress began investigating stream channelization, but this problem 
was limited to that category of activities rather than the mission of 
the agency as a whole, and political forces were not united even 
against this activity. In contrast, its Congressional oversight com­
mittees pressed actively and effectively for the continuation of its 
traditional activities, including channelization. Not until I 972, and 
more forcefully in I 974, did SCS change its posture towards NEPA. 
This occurred after its first defeat in a NEPA lawsuit, the retirement 
of its outspokenly traditionalist watershed administrator, and the 
settling of boundaries of acceptable response to NEPA by other 
agencies including the Corps. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that NEPA did force action by the federal water re­
source agencies, but that it did so in different ways and with varying 
degrees of effectiveness. Both organizational characteristics and 
political pressures were of major significance in determining the 
magnitude, speed, and character of the agencies' responses. 
First, even in the agencies' official policies and guidelines, signif­
icant differences in interpretation could and did occur. Though pub­
lic positions do not provide complete indications of agency behavior, 
since they may be reinforced or contradicted by other factors (such 
as budgetary decisions, vigor of enforcement, or attitudinal differ­
ences among field officials), they do demonstrate the crucial role 
played by administrative discretion in the implementation of legisla­
tive directives. 
Second, implementation of NEPA's procedures did not alone force 
implementation of NEPA's policy goals. The evidence presented 
indicates that during the first few years, NEPA's procedures were 
implemented largely without reference to its substantive purposes. 
The agencies acted in the context of sharply divergent interpretations 
of the relationship between the Act's policy and their own dam 
construction and stream channel excavation activities. One agency 
perceived the law as a strategic opportunity, the other as a tactical 
threat; both concentrated principally on procedures rather than on 
policy goals. 
Third, the environmental impact statement has proved to be not a 
single action-forcing mechanism, but the pivotal document of three 
such mechanisms which operate in different ways on different 
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agencies. These mechanisms are internal review as the EIS accom­
panies action proposals upward through the initiating agency, inter­
agency circulation of the EIS for review and comment by affected 
federal agencies, and publication of the statement to nongovern­
mental individuals and interest groups for review. 
Each mechanism has played an important role in influencing 
implementation of NEPA. The first serves an educational function, 
forcing the consideration of new questions in project planning and 
providing a new warning system for potential controversies. The 
second provides a new instrument in old bureaucratic battles and a 
source of information to agency officials concerning actions poten­
tially in conflict with their own.5 1 The third provides a short-term 
tactic for redistributing access to federal decisionmaking processes, 
for delaying (though rarely stopping) federal action proposals, and 
for indirectly forcing fuller implementation of NEPA's procedures. 
Fourth, the last of these mechanisms, EIS review by nongovern­
mental individuals and groups, was accompanied by the threat of ad 
hoc involvement and legal action. This made it the most effective 
action-forcing mechanism contributing to NEPA implementation 
during this initial period. It is not clear whether this mechanism is a 
force that can sustain its effectiveness indefinitely, but no agencies 
have made substantial efforts to implement NEPA in the absence of 
effective external pressures to do so. 
Despite these initial conclusions, the long-term implications of the 
agencies' responses to NEPA during this period are unclear. Litiga­
tion was an important tactic in the short run, but its effectiveness 
was limited to actions opposed by financially able and politically 
sophisticated plaintiffs. Its effectiveness over a longer period might 
be limited by the unwillingness of the courts to substitute their 
judgments for those of the agencies on substantive matters, once 
standards for procedural compliance have been established satisfac­
torily. One perennial possibility is that Congress will weaken NEPA's 
requirements by amendment.5 2 
It is conceivable that some, if not most, of the effectiveness of 
51. For the value of such statements to state agencies, see M. Hufschmidt, Environmental
Statements and Water Resource Planning in North Carolina (Water Resources Research 
Institute of the University of North Carolina, June 1974, Report No. 94). 
52. By the end of 1974 such efforts had succeeded in a small number of specific in­
stances, e.g., emergency licensing of nuclear power plants, exemption of water quality 
permit activities of EPA, construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, and a few 
others. But no general amendments to NEPA had yet been enacted despite several cam­
paigns to do so. See U.S. Congress, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: An Analysis of Proposed Legislative Modifications-First 
Session, 93rd Congress (Comm. Print 1973), prepared by the Environmental Policy Division 
of the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
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political pressures by environmentalists was a short-run phenomenon 
and not indicative of genuine shifts in the agencies' priorities. NEPA 
has not changed the legal relationships between agencies and their 
clients, nor has it altered the natural communities of interest 
between construction agencies, such as the Corps, and their benefi­
ciaries in the construction. industry. The Act has not overturned 
long-term forces such as organizing costs that tend selectively to 
favor producer over consumer interests in the political process, 5 3 nor 
has it altered the structure of Congressional committees responsible 
for oversight of agencies with development missions which are still 
disproportionately populated by advocates of those missions. Pro­
grammatic changes that did occur during this period were partly 
influenced by NEPA, but an even more important influence was 
political forces operating independently of environmental policy pur­
poses. 
Federal agencies have been preoccupied with NEPA's environ­
mental impact statement requirement since the law's enactment. 
However, NEPA contains a number of other substantial provisions 
for the achievement of its purposes which have not yet been tested. 
CEQ, for instance, could issue tougher and more explicit guidelines 
concerning overall implementation of NEPA and link EIS's to the 
achievement of NEPA's substantive policies. While CEQ lacks the 
authority to veto agency actions, its guidelines would undoubtedly 
be treated as important tests in subsequent judicial decisions. Law­
suits could be based on other provisions of NEPA, such as failure to 
develop procedures for appropriate consideration of unquantifiable 
values, promotion of imbalance between population and resource 
use, or degradation of the quality of renewable resources. 
The most important failure of NEPA so far is not the attenuation 
of its tactical mechanisms for forcing action in individual cases, but 
the rarity of its influence upon truly major federal decisions at the 
policy, programmatic, and legislative levels. The enactment of NEPA 
was an attempt to bring about administrative change by changes in 
procedures, and it may yet prove to have achieved some enduring 
success. However, such success should probably be attributed to the 
maintenance of political forces that have been engendered by the Act 
and the prevalent climate of environmental and related values, not to 
the direct effect of NEPA procedures on agency activities. 
53. See Downs, Up and Down with Ecology: The "Issue-Attention Cycle," The Public
Interest, Summer 1972, 38-50; and M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1968). 
